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Computerizing
Small Business

any Montana small busi
nesses have taken the plunge
into computers. Others are
poised on the brink, contem
plating their first, perhaps second, or even
third “generation” information processing
system. By now the technology is perva
P atterns
sive, and for the most part, it has proven a
useful adjunct to business operations.
&
However, computer systems are still
P it f a l l s
highly complex and represent a substantial
investment for most small businesses.
By
What little is written on systems
G era ld E vans
development and success in small business
M a r len e N esary
uses the Small Business Administration's
(SBA) definition of a small business:
Fewer than 250 employees and less than
$5 million in gross annual sales. Firms at
the high end of that group, however, are
very large relative to most start-up or
entrepreneurial endeavors. Relative to
Montana, firms that size qualify as “big
business.”
Small business in Montana means very
small: Retail specialty stores; legal,
medical and dental offices; insurance
agencies; personal care salons; and a
plethora of private contractors and spe
Figure 1
cialty manufacturers. Typically, such
Type of Hardware Installed
firms employ fewer than fifty people
and take in less than $1 million in
gross annual sales —a fifth of the
SBA’s upper limit. In firms this
small, profit margins tend to be
small also, and the risk associated
with investment in technology
tends to be high.
How can Montana small busi
nesses make sure their technology
investment is wise and workable? What
are the pitfalls and the costs, both explicit
and hidden, of computerizing a small
business? What are typical system devel
opment patterns and how successful are
they?

M

2

Study Sample
To get at these and related issues, the
authors selected a sample of sixty-eight
very small (fewer than fifty employees
and less than $1 million in gross annual
sales) businesses from Montana, Idaho,
and Wyoming. Criteria for inclusion in
the study included the size restriction
noted above, implementation of a new
computer information system within the
past year, and willingness to participate
in the study.
Although this sample does not
correspond to Standard Industry Classifi
cation (SIC) codes and is not the usual
simple random sample, the results are
nevertheless important for Montana
small businesses. Our survey of sixtyeight small businesses had an average of
8.3 employees per firm. In Montana the
average employees per firm are as
follows: for all manufacturing firms,
16.1; for all transportation firms, 11.2;
for all retail sales firms, 8.4; for all
service firms, 8.0; for all financial,
insurance, and real estate firms, 6.8; and
for all contract construction firms, 4.2.
Our judgement sample targeted very
small business and Montana is domi
nated by very small businesses.
Consequently, the results of this
study can be very meaningful for
Montana businesses.
A personal interview was
conducted with the owner or
manager of each firm. During
the interview, answers to 100
open-ended questions were
obtained. The survey elicited informa
tion about hardware, software, costs,
uses, and purpose of the computer
system. It also posed and attempted to
correlate the answers for three basic
research questions:

Montana Business Quarterly!Autumn 1991

COMPUTERS

^

^

Who is involved in the needs assessment,
design, implementation, training, and
evaluation of the system?
How successful is the information system
relative to goals and expectations laid out
prior to its development?
How is the system’s success -- or lack of it —
determined?

Figure 2
Type of Software Implemented

Results of the study are summarized below.

System Configuration, Purpose,
and Costs
As figure 1 shows, microcomputers are the most
popular hardware choice in the sample group.
Almost 87 percent of all computers installed were
micros. In addition to its lower cost, the micro
more nearly matched small business computing
needs. Larger machines were simply overkill.
As with many small businesses reported
elsewhere in the literature, our sample firms
purchased accounting, word processing, and
spreadsheet software significantly more often than
any other type. Database programs were a distant
fourth (see figure 2). Figure 3 summarizes the
purpose of the computer installation, with account
ing problems and data processing time as major
concerns.
Not surprisingly, small business firms sought to
contain overall operating costs via the technology,
and to recover costs associated with manual
processing of payables and receivables (figure 4).
Finally, figure 5 reflects the most common uses of
data generated by the computer.
Over half the sample firms were implementing
their first computer system. Another third were
upgrading (expanding or replacing) a single micro
computer. Most of these very small businesses
then, are at the stage larger firms were twenty
years ago: automating transactions and data to
achieve faster, more efficient operations.
A word of caution: Small businesses don’t
often purchase more advanced computer applica
tions such as decision support or expert systems, or
statistical modeling tools —and there’s a good
reason why not. Even for large firms with enviable
profit margins, the payoff from such expensive,
managerial-oriented information systems is not
well-established. So small businesses should stick
with transaction-oriented systems which are less
expensive, generally bug-free, and have a good
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Figure 3
Purpose of the System:
Problems that Needed Solving

Figure 4
Purpose of the System:
Costs that Needed Containing

Note: The total number of firms in these categories is
greater than 68 since some firms had more than one
response.
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track record. Resist a vendor’s or
consultant’s hard sell. And if you want
technology support for managerial
decision-making, explore the data
analysis and modeling available in a
spreadsheet program.
Figure 6 illustrates direct costs for
the system and includes only the
hardware, software, and installation
fees. Direct costs amounted to less
than $10,000 for over half the firms.
And nearly all of these lower-cost
systems represented the firms’ initial
stab at computerizing. Interestingly, almost 25
percent of the firms spent over $20,000; for the
most part, this group was installing a second or
third “generation” system.
Obviously, a small business should examine
estimated costs carefully. But direct costs, as cited
above, don’t necessarily cover everything. You
may find yourself saddled with fees for consultants,
maintenance contracts, user training, and special
environments to control dust and extremes of
temperature.

Figure 5
How are Data Used from the System?

Number of firms

Who Develops the System?

Figure 6
Cost of Hardware and
Software

4

Table 1 shows the key players in a typical small
business computer installation: management,
users, vendors, and consultants. Management and
vendors were the two largest contributors to system
development in the sample; users and consultants
played a secondary role. Table 2 presents the
relative involvement of each group in installing and
implementing the system. Implementation, again,
is primarily a partnership of management and
vendors. Users have a relatively larger role than
consultants in the implementation phase, but it
is still secondary.
The high degree of input from vendors
raises an important question: Does depen
dence on vendors produce an overselling of
computer products? To test this idea, we ran
correlations on three key sets of variables.
Not surprisingly, more vendor involvement was
associated with more expensive systems. Yet there
was no relationship between vendor involvement
and system success. High vendor involvement was
not associated with more successful systems and
low vendor involvement was not associated with
less successful systems. Similarly, more expensive
systems were not necessarily more successful
systems, and less expensive systems were not

necessarily less successful.
The obvious conclusion here is that small
businesses considering computerization should not
rely too heavily on vendors for system develop
ment and implementation. The end result of such
reliance could be merely more expensive —rather
than more successful -- systems.

How Successful Was the System?
Table 3 summarizes respondents’ expectations
for their new computer system. Most expected
efficiency. The largest response category was an
explicit desire for improved efficiency, and the
second largest category —“time savings” —is also
directly related to the idea. So too is “faster
reports.” Together, these eighty efficiency re
sponses are' almost double the forty-two responses
in other categories (which might be grouped as an
expectation for increased effectiveness).
Tables 4 and 5 describe the degree of satisfac
tion and success respondents felt. For table 4 data,
respondents focused on how smoothly the system
conversion went, how well employees took to the
system, and whether or not the process included
unexpected problems; overall, respondents felt
their expectations for a smooth efficient implemen
tation were well satisfied. Respondents also felt the
system was highly successful in terms of its stated
purpose (table 5).

What Does Success Mean, Exactly,
and for Whom?
This substantial feeling of success and satisfac
tion seemed to have no basis in objective fact. Few
firms undertook any formal measure of their
system’s performance. One owner/manager in our
survey, however, knew exactly what his new
computerized point-of-sale system bought. By
checking invoices for several months before and
after installation, he discovered that the system
was recovering several hundred dollars a day in
pricing errors. Additionally, the interval from a
billing cycle’s end to mailed statements dropped
from six days to one.
Evaluation like that described above takes a
little time and effort but is a good investment. If
you purchase one computer, chances are you’ll
eventually go after another one. Yet it is very
difficult to estimate how effective a new
technology will be if you inadequately understand
the old one’s effect. Small business managers
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today must be scientists, and understand what is
happening in their firms, and why.
Once you understand the “what” and “why,
you can intelligently develop solutions and spot
opportunities. A system evaluation will help you
understand the “what” and “why” of computerized
operations.
Owner/managers aren’t the only ones who
determine the success (subjective or objective) of a
new computer system. End users also have to live
with the new machine, and make it work.
Our survey attempted to measure only the
satisfaction of owner/managers. But smart manage
ment can heighten user satisfaction and conse
quently make computerization more effective.
Three specific management practices can enhance
user satisfaction.
Involve end users in the process. They’re
knowledgeable about your business and can
make valuable suggestions. Seek their advice
and input about what areas of the business
should be automated, and about hardware
and software capabilities. When individuals
are involved in a decision-making process,
they tend to “own” the decision more, and be
invested in its success.
2

3.

Provide adequate end user training. Nothing
is more discouraging than feeling pressure to
make something work and not having a clue
how to proceed. At one business in our
survey, several end users were questioned
periodically for several months after imple
mentation. They did not like the system
because they did not clearly understand how
to use it. Their poor attitude was reflected in
customer service. Computerizing your
business takes more than just placing a new
machine on an employee’s desk.
Offer to retrain displaced employees.
Technology does eliminate jobs; in fact,
reduction of labor costs is exactly the goal of
automation. But since employees tend to
sympathize with each other, one worker
replaced by machine can bring down
everyone’s morale. One company in the
survey retrained an employee to help run the
computer system, thus bypassing the need for
a layoff. Employee morale was much better
in that company than in firms using layoffs.
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Table 1
Who Does System Development?
^ rouP

Major
involvement

Management
Users
Vendors
Consultants

58
24
36
18

Minor
involvement

No
involvement

5
12
16
14

4
24
10
28

Note: Rows may not add to 68 due to lack of responses on some data.

Table 2
Who Implements the System?
GrouP
Management
Users
Vendors
Consultants

Major
involvement
47
28
35
15

Minor
involvement

No
involvement

8
5
9
8

8
28
20
39

Note: Rows may not add to 68 due to lack of responses on some data.

Table 3
Expectations for the New System
Expectation
Improvements in efficiency
Time savings
More usable information
Better managment of the firm
Faster reports

Respondents
44 firms
31 firms
25 firms
17 firms
5 firms

Note: The total number of respondents is greater than 68 since some had more
than one response.

Table 4
The Degree to Which Expectations Were Met
Reponse Category
Very well met expectations
Well met expectations
Poorly met expectations
Very poorly met expectations

Responses
3
55
9
0

Table 5
System Success Relative to System Purpose
Reponse Category
Extremely successful
Very successful
Moderately successful
Unsuccessful
Extremely unsuccessful

Respondents
7
46
10
4
0
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back issues of the magazine and make sure
the company you want to purchase from has
been around for a few years —one indication
of reliability. Also check the company’s
return policy and guarantees; most good
firms will warranty their products for a year
or longer and will pay return postage within a
certain time limit. Some also provide on-site
service as part of the purchase price. Don’t
be afraid to ask for references in your local
area; if the mail order firm is reluctant to
give you customer names, go to another firm!
And finally, mail order is not for the novice.
Buying a system with no assistance in setup
or training means you’re on your own.

General Warnings and Guidelines
In addition to the suggestions noted above, our
survey yielded a number of general guidelines.

^

I

n

s

Don’t spend thousands of dollars on a
solution for a nickel problem. One respon
dent in the survey wanted some assistance
with a software acquisition decision. He
owned a small personal care salon and was
concerned with inventory control. He’d
located a consultant to develop an inventory
control system for about $3,000. Yet the
respondent carried only about a dozen
categories, or 150 total items of inventory.
t
e
a
d
of

"Don't sp en d th o u sa n d s o f d o lla rs on
a solu tion fo r a nickel p r o b le m . "

custom”1

software, we
________________________________________________
suggested a
simple “two-box” inventory system: When
the box on the shelf sells out, open the
second box and reorder.
2

^

4.

6

Spread development costs around. One small
business in the survey contracted with a
programmer on an hourly basis. The pro
grammer gave a good faith estimate of the
number of hours it would take him to deliver
a finished database management system. He
was several months late and three times over
estimate. The moral here is never pay for the
cost of development by yourself. Spread it
around among many users by buying soft
ware that is already developed and success
fully operating in a number of locations.
A corollary is: Go with the proven system
for the proven cost. For most types of small
business (medical, legal, retail, etc.) off-theshelf software is available from a reliable
vendor. At first, the cost may seem higher
than the estimate from your sister-in-law’s
brother’s friend. But such estimates, as noted
above, are often low.
A word about mail order computers and
software. A number of our respondents
purchased their hardware and software at
very competitive prices through advertise
ments in BYTE Magazine, PC World, and PC
Magazine. None reported bad experiences
with mail order. However, it’s wise to check

^

Computerization will not solve poor manage
ment practices such as poor marketing or
poor capital management. Nor do computers
necessarily streamline cumbersome workflow patterns or correct incomplete records.
It might be worthwhile to call in a business
consultant before you call in a computer
consultant or vendor, just to make sure your
manual business systems are ready for the
run through silicon. ■
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BAD FAITH

BAD

FAI TH

A New Era for Montana?

by Jerry L. Furniss
J a c k K. M orton

ter a decade or more o f expanding and uniquely broad business
liability rulings, the Montana Supreme Court has apparently re
treated. In 1990, with Story v. City o f Bozeman, it adopted a more
conservative interpretation o f bad faith liability. The dust hasn't settled yet
and many things remain unclear. But perhaps this case signals a new trend.
One that will provide relief for Montana employers and businesses who have
been subject to millions o f dollars in bad faith damages, while at the same
time still allow aggrieved parties appropriate and reasonable redress through
the Montana courts.

A

Montana’s Legal
Anomaly
The authors discussed
Montana’s bad faith prece
dents in some detail for an
earlier article (see the Mon
tana Business Quarterly,
Summer 1988). The following
summary, however, should
provide a context for under
standing the court’s most

8

recent rulings, and suggest
some implications for the
future.
From a legal point of view,
all other states but Montana
clearly distinguish between
breach of contract lawsuits
and those involving tort
issues. Other state courts have
assumed a party has the right
to breach a contract if the

breaching party compensates
the other party for actual
losses. This “right to breach a
contract” arises from prin
ciples of freedom of contract
and rational decision making.
The courts recognize that
damages designed to compen
sate individuals for their
actual losses (compensatory
damages) are sufficient to
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discourage breach of contract.
Normally, in breach of
contract cases, the jury is not
allowed to assess punitive
damages against the breaching
party.
In the view of other state
courts, however, punitive
damages play a quite different
role if the lawsuit involves tort
issues. There, a jury is allowed
to assess punitive damages as
well as compensatory dam
ages against an individual who
intentionally commits a
grievous act such as assault,
battery, liable, slander or
fraud. This “right to punitive
damages” is based on the
notion that one who intention
ally causes grave harm to
others must be punished and
serve as an example to deter
others.
Unlike other state courts,
Montana has eroded the
distinction between breach of
contract and tort cases by
allowing tort-like punitive
damages in ordinary breach of
contract cases. This has
elevated simple breach of
contract cases and caused
tremendous uncertainty among
Montana businesses. Free to
decide damages, juries have
virtually no restriction when
determining tort-like punitive
awards. Awards need not bear
any relation to actual losses
suffered by the breached
party. Instead, damages are
based on what the jury deems
sufficient punishment for the
wrongdoer.
Many contract cases that
might have been marginal and
trivial instead became worth
-- potentially —millions of
dollars. Thus, almost every
breach of contract case in

Montana alleged bad faith and
requested that the jury award
punitive as well as compensa
tory damages to the plaintiff.
Montana’s legal approach was
considered so drastic that
precedent-watchers like the
Wall Street Journal routinely
published articles wondering
what the state’s legal system
might do next.

The Growth of
Bad Faith in Montana
Montana’s bad faith
doctrine originated in insur
ance cases. The state’s
Supreme Court felt that for
breach of insurance contracts,
compensatory damages alone
were insufficient to encourage
timely and fair settlement of
claims. If the insurance
company failed to settle in a
timely fashion, the claimant
could, at most, receive only
what was owed to begin with.
In such a case, the court
reasoned, the claimant had no
leverage against the insurance
company. Hoping to inspire
insurance companies to settle
claims properly and thereby
live up to the insurance
contract’s implied covenant of
good faith, Montana’s court
began to consider punitive
damages in breach of insur
ance contracts cases.
This doctrine was extended
to another industry in 1984
with First National Bank in
Libby v. Twombly. Montana’s
Supreme Court held that First
National’s improper recovery
on promissory obligations
amounted to the tort of bad
faith and therefore the bank
should be forced to pay
punitive damages.
Approximately at the same
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time, Montana courts applied
this radical legal theory to
employment cases. A cov
enant (promise) of good faith
and fair dealing existed in
almost every employment
context, the court reasoned.
And so it treated a breach of
this implied promise as a tort
justifying punitive damages.
Another 1984 case, Adair
v. Petroleum Marketing
Company, established when
the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing would
arise in employment cases.
The court held that the
promise of good faith existed
whenever there were “objec
tive manifestations by the
employer giving rise to the
employee’s reasonable belief
that he or she had job security
and would be treated fairly.”
If an employer dismissed an
employee and destroyed the
employee’s expectations of
continued employment, then a
bad faith dismissal could
result. This finding threatened
employers with the possibility
of six-figure punitive damage
awards.
In 1987, the Montana
Legislature attempted to limit
punitive damage awards for
employment disputes. (Mon
tana voters did not specifically
vote on this legislation.)
Punitive damages should not
be awarded, it said, except
where an employee’s dis
missal violated public policy.
For example, if an employee
were dismissed because of
religious beliefs, punitive
damages still could be
considered because a specific
statute prohibiting religious
discrimination in the work
place would have been

"Alone a m on g
S ta te S u p rem e
C ourts, M o n ta n a h a s
ex ten d ed th e to rt
d o ctrin e o f b a d fa ith
to v irtu a lly every
breach o f co n tra ct
case, in clu d in g
a rm s-len g th com 
m ercia l tra n sa c 
tions. "
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"M o n ta n a b u si
nesses sh o u ld feel
som e r e lie f...B u t
there's s till p le n ty o f
u n certa in ty."

violated. Despite these efforts
at tort reform, however,
Montana’s wrongful discharge
statute has been upheld by the
Montana Supreme Court as
constitutional and it remains
the law today.

The Extent of
Bad Faith in Montana
Only a few states besides
Montana have been willing to
apply the tort doctrine of bad
faith to insurance, employ
ment, and banking cases. And
no other court has so broadly
applied the tort of bad faith to
arms-length commercial
transactions. Alone among
State Supreme Courts,
Montana has extended the tort
doctrine of bad faith to
virtually every breach of
contract case, including armslength commercial transac
tions.
In the 1985 case of
Nicholson v. United Pacific
Insurance, the Montana
Supreme Court stated that
each party to a contract has a
justifiable expectation that the
other party will act in a
reasonable manner concerning
the performance of a contract.
If one party arbitrarily,
capriciously, or unreasonably
deprives the other party of the
benefit of a contract, or if the
injured party’s expectations
are violated, the injured party
should be entitled to tort
damages, according to the
court.
This case extended the tort
remedy of punitive damages
to commercial contracts.
Moreover, it confirmed that
the standard of misconduct
required to show bad faith is
merely unreasonable behavior.

10

After the Nicholson case,
Montana applied this same
standard to contracts involving
franchises and the sale of a
business. Such cases left
Montana alone in the field of
bad faith. Even California
(second only to Montana in
the liberality of its interpreta
tions) limited tort actions in
commercial contracts to those
cases where special relation
ships of trust and confidence
existed.

Is Montana Retreating?
Last year, in Storv v. City
of Bozeman, the Montana
Supreme Court rejected its
previously liberal use of the
tort of bad faith, at least in
arms-length contract transac
tions. The Court held that “the
tort of bad faith may still
apply in exceptional circum
stances,” and adopted stan
dards set by the California
case of Wallace v. Kroehler Manufacturing Co. In effect,
punitive damages will be
appropriate only if contracting
parties have a unique and
special relationship that gives
rise to expectations beyond
those normally found in armslength transactions.
What now defines the
“special relationship” entitling
an aggrieved party to punitive
damages? The Wallace
standard sets forth the some
what ambiguous prerequisites
for finding a “special relation
ship" (see sidebar).
While it adopted a new
standard last year, the Mon
tana Supreme Court also re
emphasized some tenants of
the old standard. “Every
contract, regardless of type,
contains an implied covenant

The Wallace t

• "The co n tract mus
in inherently uneqi

• th e motivation for
b e a non-profit me
of mind, security, f

• ordinary c o n tra c t«
b e c a u se a) they c
superior position tc
b) they d o not ma
(and)

• one party is essent
th e type of harm it
places its trust in th
(and)
• the other party is c

of good faith and fair dealing,”
said the court. “A breach of
this covenant is a breach of the
contract.”
However, “in the great
majority of ordinary con
tracts,” said the court, “the
breach of the covenant is only
a breach of the contract and
only contract damages are
due.” By adopting this
language, the court ruled out
punitive damages for ordinary
breach of contract cases. It
restricted such damages to
breach of contract cases where
the parties are in some
“special relationship” as
defined by the Wallace
standard.
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iard states that:
such that the parties are
argaining positions; (and)
ring the contract must
ion, i.e., to secure p e a c e
>protection; (and)
ages are not a d e q u a te
•t require the party in the
:ount for its action, and
ie inferior party 'whole' ;
vulnerable b ecau se of
suffer and of necessity
■^er party to perform;

t

3 of this vulnerability."

Implications for
the Future
Three days after it decided
the Story case, the Montana
Supreme Court rendered an
opinion in Lachenmaier v.
First Bank Systems. Inc. The
Lachenmaier opinion may
suggest Montana’s future
approach to bad faith litiga
tion, so we will analyze it in
some detail.
The Lachenmaiers had
problems paying off an
operating loan issued by First
State Bank of Forsyth, a part
of First Bank Systems. First
Bank Systems transferred the
problem loan to Credit

Services, Inc., a whollyowned subsidiary of First
Bank Systems. First Bank
Systems’ General Office and
its Credit Services subsidiary
were making plans to liqui
date the Lachenmaier’s assets
and foreclose on the debts. At
the same time. First Bank’s
local branch office in Forsyth
continued to loan the
Lachenmaiers money and
even encouraged them to
borrow more.
The situation deteriorated
and a lawsuit followed. The
Lachenmaiers claimed tort
damages for breach of the
implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. The
court held that the “relation
ship between a bank and its
customers is generally
described as that of a debtor
and a creditor . . . and as such
does not give rise to fiduciary
[held or founded in trust or
confidence] responsibility.”
The court also noted that
tort damages were available
only in breach of implied
covenant cases involving
“special relationships.” The
Lachenmaiers’ relationship to
First Bank Systems was not
“special” in the sense of the
Wallace standard, said the
court. Therefore, the
Lachenmaiers were not
entitled to punitive damages.
A year earlier this case would
likely have been decided
much differently.
What will the Wallace
standard -- made in California
—mean to Montana’s Su
preme Court? California has
applied the Wallace bad faith
doctrine to both insurance and
employment cases but not to
other arms-length commercial
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transactions. If Montana
follows the California ap
proach in interpreting
Wallace, it would still apply
the tort of bad faith in insur
ance cases, but would restrict
the use of tort-like punitive
damages in arms-length
commercial transactions such
as franchises, the sale of a
business, and banking transac
tions. As previously men
tioned, Montana’s 1987
legislation governing employ
ment decisions specifically
restricts punitive damage
awards to those dismissals
involving public policy
violations.
Montana businesses should
feel some relief based on the
Supreme Court’s new direc
tion. But there’s still plenty of
uncertainty. Only time will
tell if the Wallace standard
will be interpreted in Montana
as it has been in California. At
the least Montana’s Supreme
Court recognized that its bad
faith decisions had become the
most extreme in the country.
Business interests will eagerly
watch to see whether the
reversal continues. ■

Jerry Furniss is an associate
professor and Jack Morton is
a professor in The University
o f Montana's Department of
Management. They are both
attorneys.
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T he G u l f C r i s i s , I n t e r n a t io n a l L a w ,
a n d A m e r ic a n F o r e ig n P o l ic y
hen Iraq invaded Kuwait on August
2, 1990, the world community -- led
by the United States in the United
Nations -- swiftly and with surpris
ing unanimity condemned Iraq’s action.
factors combined to make possible this near-global
accord. Communist regimes had collapsed in
Eastern Europe. The Cold War had faded. And
relations between the Superpowers had improved
across a broad spectrum of diplomatic and military
areas.
Relative agreement over the course of action,
however, didn’t mean lack of debate. In this
country, political debate was vigorous and perva
sive. Montanans certainly contributed their
opinion. And their share: An estimated 4,000
Montanans served in the Persian Gulf, two of
whom were killed.
But the Gulf War’s big surprise is neither the
failure of international law to prevent invasion in
the first place, nor the subsequent political debate.
The surprise is that international legal mechanisms
were so effectively relied on to confront the crisis.
Indeed, the use of such mechanisms was historic.

W

The U.N. Charter Violations
Increased Superpower cooperation was certainly
evident in the U.N. Security Council’s response to
the Iraqi invasion. The council consists of five
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permanent members: United States, United
Kingdom, France, Soviet Union, China. During the
crisis, the council’s ten non-permanent rotating
members included Canada, Finland, Romania,
Colombia, Zaire, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Malaysia,
Several
Cuba, and Yemen. In the past, the council fre
quently has been deadlocked by permanentmember vetos —a maneuver often linked to Cold
War tensions.
Iraq’s motives for invading and attempting to
annex Kuwait remain a matter of dispute. Some
suggest unsettled territorial claims were at the root
of Iraq’s actions. Others point to disagreements
over oil-pricing policies, Iraqi greed for Kuwait’s
rich oil fields, or the megalomania of Saddam
Hussein. Perhaps Iraq, a client state of the Soviet
Union, had anticipated another Security Council
deadlock when it moved against Kuwait.
Specifically, how did Saddam violate the U.N.
Charter? Article 2, section 4 of the U.N. Charter
calls upon members to “refrain in their interna
tional relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political indepen
dence of any state . . .”
Chapter VII of the Charter provides for Security
Council action “with respect to threats to the
peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggres
sion.” It also allows the council to call for eco
nomic and other sanctions short of armed force.
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U.N. members bind themselves under Article 25 of
the Charter to “accept and carry out the decisions
of the Security Council. .
Accordingly, on August 2, 1990, the day
Saddam's troops crossed into Kuwait, the Security
Council voted to condemn the invasion as a
“breach of the peace,” and to demand Iraq’s
immediate withdrawal. Yemen abstained, but
Resolution 660 passed by a vote of 14-to-0. Iraqi
failure to comply with Resolution 660 provoked
another Security Council vote on August 6 to
impose sanctions against Iraq (13-to-0, Cuba and
Yemen abstaining). Further, a unanimous Security
Council resolution (15-to-0) on August 9 pro
claimed that Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait had “no
legal validity” and was “declared null and void”
under international law.

Violations of the Vienna and
Geneva Conventions
While Security Council resolutions expanded,
the Iraqi regime undertook more ominous actions:
It demanded that all foreign embassies in Kuwait
be closed; that all diplomatic personnel be trans
ferred to Baghdad; that those who did not comply
be stripped of diplomatic immunity; that foreign
nationals be detained; and finally, that foreign
detainees (called “guests” by Iraq and “hostages”
by others) be relocated to potential bomb targets,
and thereby provide a shield against attack.
Iraq intended to make Baghdad the new capital
of Kuwait, which was subsequently designated a
new “ 19th province" of Iraq. Many countries,
mindful of the Security Council resolutions,
refused to close their embassies in Kuwait, lest
they be seen as legitimizing Iraq’s claim to
Kuwait.
International law is quite clear —in the 1961
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, for
example, to which Iraq is a signatory —regarding
the inviolability of embassies and the protection of
diplomatic personnel even in time of war. In
peacetime, civilian aliens traveling or residing in a
foreign state have no privileged status such as that
accorded diplomatic personnel. But the norms of
international law require treatment for aliens that
is fair and equal to that accorded local nationals.
The Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
(Iraq is a signatory) provides extensive guidelines
concerning the protection of civilians caught in a
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war zone. Initially signed in Geneva on August
12, 1949, the document went into force October
21, 1950. It covers such matters as facilitated
departure, hostage taking, propagandizing,
religious freedom, forced labor, and detention in
an area particularly exposed to the dangers of
war.
In Resolution 674 of October 29, 1990, the
Security Council demanded that Iraqi authorities
comply with the Vienna and Geneva conventions
and “immediately cease and desist from taking
third-state nationals hostage, and mistreating and
oppressing Kuwaiti and third-state nationals.”
The Resolution invited states to “collate substan
tiated information” concerning Iraqi violations
and reminded Iraq “that under international law
it is liable for any loss, damage or injury in
regard to Kuwait and third states, and their
nationals and corporations, as a result of the
invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by
Iraq.”
Further, the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949), to
which Iraq is also a signatory, requires humane
treatment of prisoners of war, who “may not be
threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleas
ant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.”

France

U.S.S.R.

China

The Threat of War Crime Trials
While violations of the laws of war are numer
ous enough, victorious powers in any conflict may
demand an accounting. Even early on in the Gulf
War (also known as Operation Desert Storm) there
were calls for a Nuremberg-style trial of Iraqi
leaders. Such calls were likely one reason Iraq
stopped parading captured U.N. coalition pilots
before television cameras. No doubt the worldwide
impact of modem television provoked a negative
reaction against Iraq. With the United Nations
standing against it, Iraq would seem ill-positioned
for a defense of any war crimes against Kuwait.
Iraq could be held accountable not only for war
crimes against persons and states, but also for war
crimes against nature. Some have called for trials
based on the ecological disaster caused by
Saddam’s dumping oil into the Gulf and setting fire
to Kuwaiti oil fields. More likely, the Iraqi govern
ment will simply be presented with international
claims for damage.
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On the Record: The Case for
U.N. Military Action

Canada

Finland

Romania

Colombia

Zaire

As noted above, the U.N. Security Council
began passing a series of resolutions even before
Operation Desert Storm arrived in the Gulf. The
resolutions had several purposes: To dissuade Iraq
from further adventurism; to encourage a retreat
from previous policies; and to make official the
world’s sense of current legal norms.
On August 18, 1990, the U.N. Security Council
voted 15-to-0 (Resolution 664) to demand that Iraq
free all detained foreigners. Thousands of foreign
ers from many nations were in Iraq and Kuwait at
the time of the invasion. Resolution 664 also
implicitly warned of military action should
foreigners not be released.
The U.N. Charter provides for such an eventual
ity. According to Article 42 of the Charter:
Should the Security Council consider that
measures provided for in Article 41 would be
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate,
it may take such action by air, sea, or land
forces as may be necessary to maintain or
restore international peace and security. Such
action may include demonstrations, block
ade, and other operations by air, sea, or land
forces of Members of the United Nations.
Further, Article 43(1) of the Charter provides:
All Members of the United Nations, in order
to contribute to the maintenance of interna
tional peace and security, undertake to make
available to the Security Council, on its call
and in accordance with a special agreement
or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and
facilities, including rights of passage,
necessary for the purpose of maintaining
international peace and security.
Resolution 665 passed the Security Council on
August 25, 1990 (13-to-0, Cuba and Yemen
abstaining). It gave U.N. members the right to
enforce the embargo against Iraq with naval power.
By September 25, 1990, sanctions were widened to
include all means of transport, including air traffic
in and out of Iraq (Resolution 670). Two months
later in Resolution 678, the Security Council gave
Iraq until January 15, 1991, to comply with the
terms of its original Resolution 660 or it would
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authorize U.N. members to “use all necessary
means” to implement Resolution 660.
Iraq did not comply, and Operation Desert
Storm unfolded. Following the U.N. deadline, a
wide coalition of U.N. forces pounded Iraq into
humiliating compliance with the U.N. mandates.
Of broader significance for Americans than the socalled “ 100-hours war,” however, are the implica
tions for U.S. foreign policy and the lessons of
international law.

U.S. Foreign Policy Implications
Basically, U.S. foreign policy faced two issues
in the Persian Gulf Crisis: 1) domestic U.S. law,
especially as it relates to “war powers”; and 2) the
quagmire of political problems the United States
marched into when it decided to become involved
in Mideast affairs.
Interestingly, the legal issues confronting the
United States were domestic and not international.
The United Nations authorized the use of force
against Iraq unless it withdrew from Kuwait by
January 15, 1991. The Bush administration
supported, and indeed was a key molder of that
U.N. stance. So U.S. policy was in tune with
international law. The U.S. Congress, however,
was “not necessarily” in support of the president’s
policy.
At the heart of the matter was an enduring U.S.
constitutional dispute over which branch of
government —Congress or the president —has the
power to involve the nation’s armed forces in a
conflict. One side argues that Article I of the U.S.
Constitution gives the “war power” to Congress.
Successive U.S. presidents, on the other hand, have
pointed to Article II, which makes the president
“commander-in-chief’ of the armed forces; they
argue against “tying the president’s hands” in the
rapidly-moving arena of international relations.
This particular constitutional squabble may go
on indefinitely, but it was neatly sidestepped
during the Gulf Crisis. Perhaps convinced by the
argument that a united front was, in the words of
Republican Senator Robert Dole, the last “best
chance for peace,” the 102nd Congress moved,
after spirited debate, to support the president. The
House voted 250-to-183, and the Senate 52-to-47,
to adopt resolutions authorizing the president to
use military force against Iraq after January 15,
1991.
The political quagmire of Mideast politics

Montana Business Quarterly!Autumn 1991

GULF CRISIS

involves a debate among observers of U.S. foreign
policy and specialists in Mid-eastern affairs that,
like the U.S. constitutional debate over war
powers, may go on indefinitely. The central issue
probably concerns U.S. intervention: Can the
United States be a positive force in the Gulf,
helping to support international law? Or is the
United States stumbling into a hotbed of
ancient quarrels with little understand
ing of the explosive forces at work
there, more likely to de-stabilize the
few agents of order that do exist than to
“make things right?”
Optimists suggest U.S. intervention
could yield a number of positive
outcomes. These include reining-in
“neighborhood bullies” such as Saddam
Hussein; renewed hopes for a Mideast
peace process involving Israel and its
Arab neighbors; new diplomatic ties
between the United States and Syria and
Iran, perhaps leading to the release of
U.S. hostages held in Lebanon; new Big
Power cooperation, perhaps including military
disarmament, economic cooperation and a revived
U.N.; and the chance that democratic values might
take root (e.g., in a liberated Kuwait).
The list of negative possibilities is compelling
too: exacerbation of Arab-Israeli tensions; a fresh
wave of religious, ethnic, and national hatreds; destabilization of cultures and governments (ranging
from “uppity” women demanding the right to drive
automobiles, to royal families and citizens fighting
over “monarchy v. democracy”); and increased
competition for influence in the area.
One thing about quagmires —once you’re in,
it’s difficult to get out. The United States seems to
have a reputation for effectively prosecuting wars,
then stumbling during the peace process that
follows. Iraq’s army is out of Kuwait, but Saddam
Hussein still governs the Iraqi people. Moreover,
Iraq’s large Kurdish minority —in a problem
apparently unanticipated —continues to be
displaced and threatened.

But Is It A Precedent?
It’s probably premature to draw conclusions
about the Gulf War’s effect on international law
and American foreign policy. But at least two
observations suggest themselves, one concerning
international politics and the other national policy.
The U.N. Security Council plays a very special
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role in the maintenance of international peace and
security. In many important respects, this role
continues a pattern established during the century
between the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815) and
the beginning of World War I (1914).
This so-called Concert of Europe period began
with the defeat of Napoleon. The victorious Big
Powers of the day agreed that they had a
special responsibility (as Big Powers) to
“police the neighborhood” and act “in
concert” to regulate the flow of interna
tional relations and to keep the peace.
The Concert of Europe period involved
international conferences at irregular
intervals wherein the Big Powers would
attempt to cooperatively manage interna
tional affairs.
The system was logical in that the Big
Powers could run the show anyway, thus
it was wise to let them do so. But it also
had some logic flaws. For instance, what
if the Big Powers are irresponsible law
breakers? And what if they fight among
themselves? For much of its history the U.N.
Security Council (representing “responsible” Big
Powers) has not been able to function as intended
by those who drafted the Charter —largely because
of Big Power disagreement.
Whatever its political merits, the Persian Gulf
Crisis has provided an intriguing hint of Security
Council prospects for managing international
relations. Perhaps the Big Powers can agree on
means for “policing the neighborhood."
The use of force in international relations —as
with the Gulf Crisis —shows that diplomacy has
failed. But the credible, demonstrable prospect of a
world community mobilizing force to keep the
peace might act as a powerful incentive to engage
in more serious diplomacy.
The Persian Gulf Crisis also delivered a clear
message about national foreign policy. In a charged
political atmosphere where U.S. motives for
involvement in the Gulf Crisis were questioned
(e.g., is the fight really about upholding interna
tional law or about securing U.S. oil supplies?),
foreign policy positions seemed to fare best when
supported by the international community.
As the world grows closer together and more
interdependent, increased international consultation
and cooperation appear as tidy vehicles for manag
ing international relations peacefully.

Ethopia

Ivory Coast

Malaysia

Cuba

Yemen

Forest Grieves is
chair o f the political
science department
at The University o f
Montana.
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Summary of United Nations Resolutions
Concerning Iraq and the Persian Gulf Crisis
Resolution 660 (August 2,1990)
The Security Council: Alarmed by the invasion of
Kuwait on August 2, 1990 by Iraq; Determining that there
exists a breach of international peace and security regarding
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; Acting under Articles 39 and
40 of the U.N. Charter;
1. Condemns the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
2. Demands that Iraq withdraw immediately and uncondi
tionally all its forces to the positions in which they were
located on August 1, 1990.
3. Calls upon Iraq and Kuwait to begin immediately
intensive negotiations for the resolution of their differences
and supports all efforts in this regard, and especially those
of the Arab League.
4. Decides to meet again as necessary to consider further
steps to ensure compliance with this resolution.
Resolution 661 (August 6,1990)
Imposed mandatory sanctions against Iraq for not
complying with Resolution 660. Created a Security Council
committee to report on the sanctions.
Resolution 662 (August 9,1990)
Declared the annexation of Kuwait invalid.
Resolution 664 (August 18,1990)
Demanded the safe passage from Kuwait and Iraq of
third-country nationals and demanded that Iraq rescind
orders to close diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait.
Resolution 665 (August 25,1990)
Called for a naval embargo to support the sanctions.
Resolution 666 (September 13,1990)
Called for assessing the supply of food in Iraq and
Kuwait for humanitarian purposes and noted that Resolution
661 does not relate to medical supplies.
Resolution 667 (September 16,1990)
Condemned action taken by Iraq against diplomatic
missions and personnel in Kuwait.
Resolution 669 (September 24,1990)
Called on the committee established under Resolution
661 to examine requests for assistance by states under
Article 50 of the U.N. Charter.
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Resolution 670 (September 25,1990)
Noted that sanctions imposed against Iraq include all
means of transport, including aircraft.
Resolution 674 (October 29,1990)
Demanded that Iraq stop taking third-country nationals
hostage, that it no longer mistreat Kuwaitis, and that it
protect diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait. Also
requested that the Secretary General use his offices to
achieve those aims.
Resolution 677 (November 28,1990)
Condemned attempts by Iraq to change the demographic
composition of Kuwait and to destroy its civil records and
asks the Secretary General to keep a copy of the population
registration as of August 1, 1990.
Resolution 678 (November 29,1990)
Granted a pause of goodwill to allow Iraq a final opportu
nity to withdraw from Kuwait, while authorizing members
states to “use all necessary means” to implement resolution
660 if Iraq has not complied by January 15, 1991.
Resolution 686 (March 2,1991)
Demanded that Baghdad, as a condition for a cease-fire in
the Gulf War, return all prisoners of war, abducted Kuwaiti
citizens and plundered property; accept liability for war
damages and losses to Kuwait, other nations and corpora
tions; rescind its annexation of Kuwait; and disclose the
location of mine fields and booby traps.
Resolution 687 (April 3,1991)
Demanded Iraq formally accept the current borders of
Kuwait; surrender all material that can be used to make
nuclear and other dangerous weapons; agree to put a portion
of its future oil profits toward Kuwaiti reparation payments;
renounce terrorism; and accept a ban on imports of weapons
as conditions for an end to the Gulf War.
Resolution 688 (April 5,1991)
Condemned Iraq’s oppression of its Kurdish population
and other segments of the civilian population and asked the
Secretary General to investigate their plight. ■
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Recession Not as Bad in Montana
as in rest of United States
UM economist predicts the recession is nearing an end
and the nation is beginning to recover
he recession has been less
severe in Montana than in
other parts of the nation and a
University of Montana economist
expects this pattern will continue.
Paul Polzin, director of UM’s Bureau
of Business and Economic Research
made this forecast as part of the
Economics Montana program, cospon
sored by the bureau, the Office of the
Governor, and the Montana State
Legislature.
Since the recession began last
summer, the U.S. economy has slowed
noticeably, Polzin says. U.S. non-farm
labor income was stable during 1990,
while the corresponding figures for
Montana showed growth of 0.7
percent, he says.
“In 1991, we expect Montana’s
economy to continue to grow modestly,
while the U.S. non-farm labor income
is expected to decline,” Polzin says.
During most previous recessions,
Polzin says, Montana has been im
pacted less than other states because of
its dependence on industries such as
agriculture, which has ups and downs

T

nearing an end and that the nation is
beginning to recover. This means
that conditions in Montana should
improve during the last half of 1991,
he says.
“After the recession we will return
to the more normal situation where
economic growth in Montana will be
less than the U.S. average,” Polzin
says. “In 1992, we forecast that
These forecasts are part o f Economics
Montana will increase 2.5 percent, as
Montana, a program cosponsored by the
compared to a national average of
UM Bureau o f Business and Economic
4.3 percent.”
Research, the Office o f the Governor, and
Personal income, one of the major
the Montana State Legislature.
determinants of retail sales, will
that do not usually correspond to the
increase slightly less than 2 percent
national business cycle.
per year in 1992 and 1993, Polzin
Western Montana is being hit harder
says.
by the recession than other parts of the
This growth will average about 1.5
state because the forest products industry
percentage points less than the
is concentrated there, Polzin says.
national average, he says.
Unlike agriculture, national business
Montana's job market will improve
cycles do impact this industry, he says.
slightly after the recession ends,
Last winter’s six-week closures by the
Polzin says. After little or no growth
state’s two largest Champion operations
in the recession year 1991, Montana
are examples of recession-related
non-farm wage and salary jobs
impacts, he says.
should increase by about 5,000 per
Polzin says that the recession may be
year in 1992 and 1993, he says. ■
Table 1
Economic T rends for the U.S. Economy,
1987 -1993
Actual and Projected as of May 1991
1987

RealGNP
percent change
Inflation (CPI - U)
percent change
Interest rate, percent
90-day T-Bills
Mortgage rate
Housing starts.
millions
Unemployment rale,
percent

Actual1988 1989

— - Projected —
1990

1991

1992

1993

3.4

4.5

2.5

1.0

0.0

3.6

3.1

3.7

4.1

4.8

5.4

4.3

3.9

5.0

5.8
9.3

6.7
9.3

8.1
10.1

7.5
10.0

5.7
9.6

6.2
10.0

6.9
10.3

1.6

1.5

1.4

1.2

1-0

1.4

1.4

62

55

5.3

5.5

6.7

6.2

6.0

Source: Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates (May 1991).
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Table 2
Employm ent, M ontana, 1987 -1993
Actual and Projected as of May 1991
----------------------Thousands of Jobs ------------------------Projected -----1987 1988 1989
1990
1991
1992 1993
298.8 304.0 310.0
Nonfarm wage & salary jobs
275.0 283.2 291.1 297.3
6.2
6.3
4.8
6.2
6.2
6.3
6.1
Mining
10.4
10.3 10.5
Construction
8.6
9.0
9.8
10.1
22.4 22.6
22.4
22.3
Manufacturing
21.0 21.5 22.3
8.4
8.3
Wood & paper products
9.2
9.0
9.3
9.0
8.6
Other manufacturing
13.4
13.7
14.0 14.3
11.8 12.5 13.0
19.3 19.1
Transportation & utilities
19.6 19.5 20.0
20.1
19.6
3.4
3.6
3.5
3.3
3.3
Railroads
3.3
3.6
8.7
8.7
Nonrailroads
8.0
8.3
8.5
8.8
8.6
Public Utilities
8.2
7.9
7.7
7.5
7.3
7.1
7.9
78.4
80.7
82.5
72.7 74.7 77.1
79.1
Trade
15.8
14.7 14.4
Wholesale trade
14.8 15.1 15.7
15.1
Retail trade
57.9 59.6 61.4
62.6
64.0
66.0 68.1
13.8 14.2
Finance, ins. & real estate
13.3 13.5 13.2
13.3
13.5
65.0 68.0 72.2
75.6
77.9
81.2 84.7
Services
28.2 29.8
Health
23.1 23.8 24.8
26.0
26.6
Nonhealth
41.9 44.2 47.4
49.6
51.3
53.0 54.9
70.2
Government
70.0 70.8 70.3
70.8
70.1 70.1
Federal (civilian)
13.2 13.8 13.8
13.9
13.6
13.6 13.6
56.5 56.5
State & local
56.8 57.0 56.5
56.9
56.6
Sources: Montana Department of Labor and Industry, Research and Analysis Division; and The
University of Montana, Bureau of Business and Economic Research, Economics Montana.

Table 3
Personal Income by Major Component, Montana, 1986 - 1992
Actual and Projected as of May 1991
—
1987
9,986
Total personal income
437
Farm labor income
6,165
Nonfarm labor income
52
Agr. & forestry services
203
Mining
55
Coal mining
62
Oil & gas extraction
57
Metal mining
29
Nonmetal mining
360
Construction
557
Manufacturing
262
Wood & paper products
295
Other manufacturing
692
Transportation & utilities
134
Railroads
214
Trucking
121
Communications
169
Nonrailroads
55
Trade
1,079
Wholesale trade
349
Retail trade
730
Finance, Ins. & real estate
333
Services
1,491
Health
580
Nonhealth
911
Government
1,397
Federal
345
Civilian
111
State & local
941
Less Social security contributions
452
11
Residence adjustment
1,935
Dividends, interest & rent
1,889
Transfer payments

Millions of Dollars
Actuial-------

1988

1989

1990

10,427 11,392 12,074
474
296
473
6,547 6,892 7,293
56
51
53
254
236
248
56
55
55
67
63
70
82
101
101
32
28
28
386
405
431
645
576
619
262
280
286
340
359
313
713
720
753
129
127
132
219
226
233
124
125
122
179
180
189
77
61
62
1,150
1,236 1,290
355
387
406
884
795
850
314
333
331
1,778 1,939
1,635
633
682
736
1,097 1,203
1,001
1,467
1,519 1,594
394
382
411
119
133
135
967
991 1,048
497
549
590
13
14
15
2,071
2,433 2,576
1,998 2,128 2,307

1991

------ Millions of 1989 D ollars---------------------A ctual-------------Projected ■■ "

Projected
1992

1993

12,660 13,251
550
475
7,652 8,088
52
52
271
255
60
62
80
75
96
102
25
26
468
513
671
702
287
293
384
409
758
778
133
131
247
240
122
123
197
206
66
69
1,327 1,386
410
419
917
967
372
403
2,092 2,257
874
796
1,295 1,384
1,657 1,728
447
428
140
146
1,089 1,135
600
632
15
15
2,603 2,721
2,440 2,583

14,092
480
8,586
53
292
65
87
112
28
548
736
300
436
807
138
255
124
216
74
1,456
434
1,022
432
2,462
969
1,494
1,802
468
152
1,182
670
15
2.942
2,739

1987

1988

10,838 10,897
474
309
6,691 6,842
54
57
246
220
57
59
70
68
62
85
34
32
404
391
604
602
284
274
327
321
751
745
146
135
232
229
130
131
187
183
64
59
1,171 1,202
371
378
793
831
348
361
1,619 1,708
630
662
989 1,046
1,517 1,533
375
399
121
124
1,021 1,010
490
519
12
14
2,100 2,165
2,050 2,088

1989

1990

11,392 11,490
474
450
6,892
6,940
53
53
242
248
52
56
63
67
101
96
28 .
27
405
410
619
614
272
280
340
342
717
720
127
126
222
226
125
116
180
180
74
62
1,236
1,228
387
386
841
850
314
315
1,778
1,845
682
700
1,097
1,145
1,517
1,519
394
391
133
128
991
997
549
561
14
14
2,433
2.451
2,195
2,128

1991

1992

1993

11,598 11,782 12,035
504
422
410
7,010 7,191 7,333
48
46
45
234
241
249
55
56
55
68
71
75
95
88
91
23
24
23
468
429
456
624
615
628
260
256
263
364
352
372
694
691
689
122
117
117
219
219
218
112
110
106
184
181
185
60
62
63
1,216 1,232 1,243
372
375
370
840
860
873
341
358
369
1,916 2,007 2,103
777
827
729
1,187 1,230 1,276
1,518 1,536 1,539
392
400
397
130
130
129
997 1,009 1,010
550
561
572
13
14
13
2,384 2,419 2,513
2,235 2,297 2,339

Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; and The University of Montana. Bureau of Business and Economic Research. Economics Montana.
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POPULATION

You’ve probably heard that Montana’s population has been shift
ing steadily westward. And certainly some eastern counties have
lost population while some western counties have gained popula
tion. But what about overall population dispersal throughout the
state?
Using county population figures from the U.S. Census, we
calculated median lines for Montana’s north-south dispersal and its
east-west dispersal. Where these lines cross is the theoretical
center of the state’s population: half resides to the east, half to the
west; half to the north, half to the south.
This simple measure suggests what Great Falls residents have
known all along — they’re close to the heart of Montana.
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Bureau of Business and Economic Research
LARRY GIANCHETTA
Dean, School of Business Administration

The Bureau of Business and Economic Research is the research and
public service branch of The University of Montana’s School of Business
Administration.
The Bureau is regularly involved in a wide variety of activities, including
economic analysis and forecasting, forest products industry research, and
survey research.
The Bureau’s Economics Montana forecasting system is an effort to
provide public and private decision makers with reliable forecasts and
analysis. It is made possible by a generous grant from US West. These
state and local area forecasts are the focus of the annual series of
Economic Outlook Seminars, cosponsored by the Bureau and respective
Chambers of Commerce in Billings, Bozeman, Butte, Great Falls, Helena,
Kalispell, and Missoula.
The Bureau also has available county data packages for all Montana
counties. These packages provide up-to-date economic and demographic
information developed by the Bureau and not available elsewhere.
The Montana Poll, a quarterly public opinion poll, questions Montanans
about their views on a variety of economic and social issues. It is
cosponsored by the Bureau and the Great Falls Tribune. In addition, the
Bureau conducts contract survey research and offers a random digit
dialing program for survey organizations in need of random telephone
samples.
The Forest Industries Data Collection System, a census of forest industry
firms conducted approximately every five years, provides a large amount of
information about raw materials sources and uses in Montana, Idaho, and
Wyoming. It is funded by the U.S. Forest Service. The Montana Forest
Industries Information System collects quarterly information on the
employment and earnings of production workers in the Montana industry.
It is cosponsored by the Montana Wood Products Association.
The Bureau’s Natural Resource Industry Research Program enables the
Bureau to continuously monitor Montana’s natural resource industries and
improve the public’s knowledge of them and their roles in the state and
local economies. This program provides easily accessible information about
all the natural resource industries. Sponsors are the Montana Mining
Association, Plum Creek Timber Company, Montana Petroleum
Association, Montana Wood Products Association, and American Forest
Resource Alliance.
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are welcome to comment on the M BQ, request
economic data or other Bureau publications,
or to inquire about the Bureau’s research
capabilities.
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